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Book Review 
Moral Acquaintances: Methodology in Bioethics, by Kevin Wm. Wildes, 
SJ, Notre Dame Indiana, 2000, 214 pp. 
The field of bioethics amply illustrates that morally, ours is a pluralistic 
culture. Kevin Wm. Wildes, SJ., in his book Moral Acquaintances: 
Methodology in Bioethics undertakes to assess the strengths and limitations 
of the reigning methods of bioethics and to propose methods that will 
enable bioethics to operate better in our pluralistic times, methods based on 
the concept of moral acquaintanceship, a concept that attempts to build on 
values or principles opposing theories might hold in common. 
It is not until very late into the book that Wildes makes explicit his 
understanding of bioethics. It is: "a discipline that resolves moral 
controversies in medical research, experimentation, clinical treatment, and 
health care policy. As a field of inquiry seeking to resolve moral 
controversies, bioethics has sought agreement or consensus with a zeal 
reminiscent of the knights' search for the lost chalice. Each method in 
bioethics attempts to establish as much agreement as possible, and 
different methods legitimate themselves, in part, by their ability to 
articulate agreement." Had this definition appeared earlier in the book, it 
would have saved some readers much frustration and confusion, that is, 
those who operate with the understanding that bioethics is a subdiscipline 
of ethics, that it is the attempt to discem what is the moral action in a given 
situation (in the health care arena) and what reasons justify that action. 
This definition explains the curious categories Wild~ uses to evaluate 
valious theories; that is, for instance, he regularly faults an ethical system, 
here called a method, for not achieving a consensus in a pluralistic culture. 
The terms of evaluation employed by Wildes suggest that "truth" is 
not a comfortable category for him. In fact, "true" and "false" or "moral" 
and "immoral" or "good" and "evil" or "light" and "wrong" are words that 
rarely appear in Wildes' discourse and when they do they are regularly 
placed in quotation marks. His discourse is full of talk about methods that 
are "appealing" or "attractive", about choices that are "appropriate" or 
"inappropriate", about methods that have "strengths" and "weaknesses." 
Wildes' choices for representatives of various theories/methods 
are interesting. Books on bioethics regularly review the philosophic 
options: utilitarianism, deontology, principlism, natural law, virtue based 
ethics, feminist care ethics, and casuistry are generally the primary players. 
Peter Singer is Wildes' utilitarian, Alan Donagan his deontologist, Grisez/ 
BoylelFinnis/May his natural law theorists and Pellegrino and Thomasma 
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his virtue theory ethicists. To be sure, there is something refreshing about 
these substitutions for Mill, Kant, Thomas, and Aristotle, but one would 
think he would give a nod to those whom to date have been enshrined as 
standard place holders by the bioethical establishment. 
Indeed, although Wildes ' choices are refreshing, one wonders if they 
are altogether appropriate. (The pluralism is much greater of course than 
this list indicates; it celtainly pays little heed to various religious 
commitments nor to the fact that rarely could or would a physician or 
patient identify himself or herself as one of these. So one may doubt the 
"real-life" relevance of these philosophic inventories.) The field of 
bioethics tends to consider as a deontologist anyone who thinks that there 
are intrinsic evils: Kant, the original and premier deontologist, reasoned 
only in terms of absolute, universal evils, but many of those deemed 
deontologists, such as some Christians, acknowledge only a few intrinsic 
evils. Rights theorists, too, seem to have some absolutes, but does this 
make them deontologists? The late Donagan is more of a deontologist than 
many who are identified as such but I am not aware that he published on 
bioethical issues or that his "method" is used to address bioethical 
problems. 
Wildes' choice of representative thinkers in the natural law tradition 
is also suspect; regrettably, in my view, Grisez/BoylelFinnis/May have 
come to occupy primacy of place in many surveys as modem natural law 
theorists although they are fierce opponents of the AristotelianlThomistic 
natural law theory that has informed much of Catholic ethics, the home of 
natural law ethics. Wildes asserts that their natural law theory is based on 
"self-evident" basic goods and counts it as the third of three Roman 
Catholic natural law traditions. The physicalist natural law of the tradition 
is said to have framed the Church's teaching on sexual ' matters and its 
representative proponent is Pope Pius XI and his condemnation of 
contraception. (I wonder why Pope Paul VI escaped censure.) He 
mentions in passing that there is a "person-centered" natural law tradition, 
represented by Joseph Fuchs, SJ., that "takes into account the 
psychological aspects of human nature." (One suspects he approves this 
method, for after all, it makes room for contraception.) No mention is 
made of Pope John Paul II's personalism, a version of natural law that 
focuses on the person and that upholds the condemnation of contraception. 
I chose Wildes' book as a textbook for a graduate course in bioethics 
since Wildes exhibits a suitable familiarity with the various reigning 
theories in bioethics and 1 was interested in his focus on the problems 
bioethics faces in a pluralistic culture. Yet this book proved to be 
immensely disappointing as an exhibit of philosophic thinking. 
Wildes makes abundant distinctions in his book, not all of them of 
sufficient clarity. Indeed, it is no small deficiency in his methodology that 
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the word "method" itself is left undefined; it is helpful that he equates it 
with proceduralism and likens methodology to the "rules of a game", yet 
his willingness to nearly identify theories with methods left my graduate 
students and myself confused about his precise meaning (more about this 
below). 
The most significant deficiency of the work is that Wildes does not 
systematically identify the criteria by which he evaluates different 
"methods", nor attempts to justify his criteria. While Wildes constantly 
asserts that thinkers are often not self-conscious enough about the 
assumptions that undergird and form their thought and criticizes various 
theories for not sufficiently justifying their governing principles, he 
exhibits no awareness that his enterprise is lacking the same self-conscious 
awareness of fundamental commitments and is without explicit 
justification. The desire to find some "trans-theory" methodes), some 
bioethical methodes) that will suit a pluralistic culture, is itself, of course, 
based on some assumptions of what is good; assumptions Wildes does not 
identify or justify until very late in the book and then inadequately. In fact, 
it is not clear whether Wildes thinks pluralism in itself is a problem or a 
benefit or both or what criteria would help us decide. It is clear that Wildes 
thinks that working in communities is better than not and that coming to a 
consensus is valuable (for methods that help communities operate and 
build consensus are deemed appealing) but he does tell us why he thinks 
so, beyond saying that it is obvious and he intuits it to be such (125). 
Certainly, one's philosophic commitments would determine what 
value one would find in "pluralism", how important it would be to 
accommodate one's method to pluralism, the way in which one would 
operate in a pluralistic culture; that is, one supposes that a utilitarian, 
deontologist, principlist, natural law ethicist, virtue ba~ed ethicist, feminist 
care ethicist, and casuist would all have different assessments of 
"pluralism", its problems and benefits, and would have different proposals 
how to live morally in pluralistic cultures (I would find very useful a 
volume with essays by each on the question of pluralism). Much of what 
Wildes says indicates that he does not think there is some detached position 
from which one can view pluralism and resolve what "problem" it may 
present or take advantage of what "benefit" might be associated with it, but 
his practice of proceeding without identifying and justifying his own 
philosophical commitments conflicts with his insistence that others be self-
conscious about theirs. 
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His assessment of natural law theories is typical: 
Natural law approaches have at least two elements which make them 
attractivc. First they assume that moral knowledge (principles) can be 
apprehended by reason. If the project succeeds there would be a way 
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by which moral agents , from different cultures, would be bound 
together. Second, they take seriously the pluralism of moral reasons 
by trying to include a variety of arguments (deontological, 
teleological). (38) 
Wildes gives no indication of how "theory-bound" his evaluations 
are; that is, he never tells us why a theory is more attractive because it binds 
cultures together. He praises theories and methods for features they may 
not value in the same way. Certainly, the commitment of natural law to 
reason is not because of its "bonding" powers (though that is a benefit), but 
is based on a view of man as a rational animal and of action in accord with 
one's nature as a good, an understanding that natural law theorists think is 
an objective truth accessible to humans everywhere. Furthermore, natural 
law's incorporation of a "variety of arguments" is not based on a desire to 
be pluralistic, but is considered necessary because of the nature of reality. 
The assessment of the strengths and limitations of various theories/ 
methods occupies the first part of Wildes' book. Again, I find his close 
association with theory and method to be problematic. In Wildes' view, 
utilitarianism, deontology, natural law, and virtue ethics are all theories and 
methods as well - in fact, they are all methods of fundamentally the same 
kind, that is, foundationalism . Foundational theories posit some universal 
principle and then try to determine the morality of particular acts by 
applying the universal to the particular. In general, Wildes finds such 
theories/methods likely incompatible with bioethics, since bioethics is so 
much about the particular; he finds universals rather without "content" and 
when such theories do provide content, that makes them less useful in a 
pluralistic culture. There is only some slight suggestion that he 
understands how ironic it is to critique a system for not hav\,ug content and 
then finding it useless when it does provide content (and not because one 
finds the content wrong.) 
While it might be true for some theories that posit "universals" that 
the content is "thin", it is not true of all. For instance, Wildes faults an 
ethics that begins with the principle "Do good, avoid evil" as "not very 
helpful" since it does not tell us "what good should be done or what evil 
avoided." Now the one theory I know that "begins" with that very principle 
(Thomism), is not unclear on what is good and what is evil; what is good is 
what is in accord with human nature and what is evil is what violates 
human nature. Nor are adherents kept in the dark about what human nature 
is. While Wildes occasionally acknowledges that various ethical systems 
involve various metaphysical and epistemological "assumptions" and 
commitments, he rarely acknowledges that sometimes these are fully 
developed, acknowledged, and incorporated into an ethical theory and that 
they are essential to the content of the theory. 
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Moreover, Wildes does not acknowledge that there may be some 
difficulty if not injustice in assessing theories/methods for their utility in 
dealing with the problems of a pluralistic culture if they were not devised 
with that purpose in mind. In my understanding, ethical theories rarely 
were devised with the intent of providing a method for decision-making, 
rather they provide a means for explaining why such actions as adultery are 
wrong. In general, they might assist one in justifying the decisions one 
makes should the need arise more than in guiding one in making decisions. 
Mill, for instance, explicitly denied that utilitarians would customarily use 
the utility principle to guide their choices; rather they would be using the 
wisdom of their tradition (wise because it is based on the utility principle). 
A natural law theorist might employ the ten commandments and never 
make explicit reference to "do good, avoid evil" or "act in accord with 
nature." Again, for instance, Aristotle thought one would avoid 
committing adultery because one had been habituated well; his ethical 
theory largely explained why habituation was necessary for good ethical 
behavior. What he was seeking was the truth about what is the end of 
human action and what action advances that end and what action deflects 
from that end. He did not articulate any "method" for making ethical 
decisions. 
Wildes realizes that his discovery of fatal flaws in all theories/ 
methods and his abandonment of the attempt to find some "content" full 
ethics that would win our allegiance, may suggest that all that is left is 
relativism. But Wildes is a fierce opponent of relativism, not, though, 
because it is false. His definition of relativism is strange: "The relativist 
view is that it really does not matter which position one holds on any 
matter." (146) (Another possible definition is, of course, that it does make 
a difference what position one holds, but the criteria are relative to a certain 
culture.). Wildes finds "a problem with [the indifferentism that follows 
upon relativism] is that if one holds it, he or she will have no incentive to 
reach a consensus with anyone who holds different views." (146) 
Wildes prefers "communitarian" ethics and the extent of his 
justification for that preference seems to be that "no human being exists 
alone;" (125) he certainly makes no claim that truth is better achieved 
through community. He also lauds the "postmodern" insight that the 
"focus falls more on the particular, and the local than on the universal and 
the necessary. In a secular society that is multicultural and morally 
pluralistic no single communitarian bioethics method is possible." 
In the final pages of the book, Wildes provides a fairly skimpy 
presentation of how he thinks the concept of moral acquaintanceship can 
help solve the problems of bioethics. Moral acquaintances have something 
in common: values, paradigmatic cases, principles, for instance. When 
two bioethicists meet, one of their major concerns should be attempting to 
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discern what they may have in common, for these may become building 
blocks for further agreement. For Wildes this is an advance beyond 
Englehardt's moral strangers who rely only upon a rule-laden 
proceduralism that Wildes finds too thin since it has so little content. 
Wildes advocates a proceduralism among moral acquaintances in a 
secular pluralistic society that is based upon four elements: 1) a 
commitment to liberty; 2) recourse to the law to set limits; 3) a recognition 
of the limits of authority and 4) toleration of differences. This is just about 
the totality of his description of his proposal for proceduralism based on 
moral acquaintanceship; no examples are given of what procedures might 
bring about consensus. I find this description not only content thin but 
"rule" thin. 
Wildes puts his cliteria to test in respect to two issues that greatly test 
bioethics' desire to achieve consensus: abortion and assisted suicide. 
Wildes' method seems to fail completely in respect to abortion since he 
makes no judgment at all about it; he simply has recourse to his 
characteristic practice of positing a series of questions that an issue raises. 
Conversely, he is surprisingly crystal clear on what his proceduralism 
yields in respect to assisted suicide: "I find no general, secular moral 
argument that can justify the state's prohibition of assisted suicide. 
Arguments against suicide are unavoidably based in particular views of the 
good life and the good death." This point is highly debatable and deserves 
some debate. Certainly I share the assessment that ours is a pluralistic 
culture but I am less convinced that it is thoroughly secular. In this 
pluralistic culture forty-nine states still have laws against assisted suicide 
(laws arguably reflecting an earlier common morality), laws largely 
observed, and some of them have been recently reaffirmed in the face of 
movements for revision. 
Wildes' clarity on assisted suicide leads one to wonder if he is an 
advocate of assisted suicide. For one could well imagine that the opponent 
of assisted suicide, one who wishes to promote the culture of life, might 
find the presence of these laws on the books a basis on which to attempt to 
reconstruct the common morality once in place. Wildes, however, never 
explores how a common morality might be achieved; he explores only how 
to live in a pluralistic culture. His project does not seem to advocate that 
bioethicists debate or discuss their differences or that they attempt to 
persuade each other of the truth of their respective positions or that they 
attempt to find the ground of disagreement between different theories/ 
methods as contributing to the effort to "do" bioethics in a pluralistic 
culture. He promotes only the effort to find common ground. 
Wildes becomes quite innovative at one point and makes the only 
specific proposal of the book. He floats the idea that a "voucher" system for 
health care may be good for a pluralistic society. One individual might use his 
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vouchers to prolong life; another to visit Kevorkian's clinic. Such proposals 
might work for adherents to ethical systems who only want to be left alone to 
pursue their own moral course. But for those who labor under the impression 
that they are their brother's keeper, such a laissez-faire attitude towards the 
wrong-doing of others will not be so attractive. 
Let me stress again that Wildes never speaks of efforts to persuade 
others of one's point of view, of the desire one might have to prevent 
others, if only by persuasion, from doing something evil, of trying to help 
others save their own souls by discerning God's will better. He seems to 
think that everyone shares his passion that consensus should be a dominant 
value and, indeed, the goal of bioethics. There is little in this book that 
could be of help to opponents of the Culture of Death, those who believe 
Christ's command that the Church must be a "sign of contradiction" to the 
point of martyrdom. 
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